# A Populist Wave or Metamorphosis of a Chameleon? Populist Attitudes and the Vote in 2016 in the United States and Ireland

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*Abstract:* In the era of Brexit and President Trump, it is clear that we need to talk about populism. Populist political campaigns feature ever more widely, suggesting the phenomenon of a 'populist wave'. But do populist sentiments shape vote choice? Using data from Ireland and the United States, incorporating CSES Module 5 questions that focused on populist sentiments and vote choice in 2016, we show that populist sentiments did motivate voters in both countries. We also demonstrate, however, that the old reliables – economic perceptions, partisanship, and left-right ideology – mattered more. Thus, an exclusive focus on populism for the success of Donald Trump in the US or Sinn Féin/AAA in Ireland is unwarranted. Further, populist sentiments motivating vote choice differed between the two countries, raising fresh questions about whether populism can be regarded as an ideology and whether even the "chameleon" metaphor overclaims coherence for the term.

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# I INTRODUCTION

2016 was a seminal year in politics. It saw Britain's decision to leave the EU ('Brexit') and the rise of anti-establishment parties and candidates in Australia, Iceland, Ireland, the Philippines, Slovakia and Spain. There was also perhaps the biggest electoral earthquake in modern times: Donald Trump's victory in the American Presidential election, on what was widely accepted as a populist programme. Reflecting on such events, Adam Taylor (2016) of the *Washington Post* concluded: "If you had to sum up 2016 in one word, you might choose 'populism'".

This followed successes for populist campaigns in Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Bolivia, leading to talk of a populist wave (Galston, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). This thesis posits that populist sentiments are spreading worldwide and are a primary determinant in election outcomes. A plethora of research on populism has developed, including a dimension examining its impact on vote choice (e.g. Pauwels, 2011; Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Rooduijn *et al*., 2016; Rooduijn, 2018).

However, lacunae remain. A preponderance of populism voting studies focuses on the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and more recently Spain and Greece. While comparative studies are emerging, concentration remains on states that are relatively similar and that have a clear populist party in situ. Studies of countries that do not fit this profile are rarer. Additionally, reliance on data from non-election studies is frequent, often incorporating online samples, which rely on intention rather than reported behavior, raising questions about potential recall bias.

Conceptually, the definition of populism is contested. While everyone agrees on a starting point of 'the people' versus an adversary, the purist perspective argues that a sole focus on 'the elite' as the nemesis is the only genuine form of populism, and is sufficient for it to qualify as an ideology (e.g. Akkerman *et al.*, 2014; Mudde, 2004). Others consider 'the people's' struggle in the context of a range of 'host' ideologies (e.g. Taggart, 2000; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; de Koster *et al.*, 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). Some have highlighted that the nemeses depend on the political actors framing them, leading to suggestions that separate strands of left-wing and right-wing populism, or subtypes exist (e.g. March 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Meanwhile, others contest populism's characterisation as an ideology, with the idea of it even constituting a thin-centred ideology dismissed (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski and Gidron, 2016). Meanwhile, opposition to the firmly entrenched purist view that anti-elitism is the only genuine form of populism and that populism constitutes an ideology is controversial and provokes claims that populism is not being adequately measured.

Most existing work on vote choice and populism has focused on three tenets, namely immigration, anti-EU sentiment, and anti-elitism. Few studies have sought to explore the impact of nativist attitudes on the vote empirically – feelings regarding what characteristics are essential for a person to belong to a particular

nationality, and which we argue are linked to populism in the sense that they imply an anti-pluralist predisposition. The impact of a strong leader, another attribute associated with the success of populist parties (Mudde, 2004), also remains less explored in the voting literature. Our paper fills this void. Our contribution assumes a symbiotic relationship between 'populism' and several 'host ideologies', thus deviating from the purist view of simply focusing on anti-elitism. While our conceptualisation of populism incorporates the 'purist' view (Mudde, 2004), we also explore a broader range of nemeses identified in the literature that pits the virtuous people against a range of out-groups (immigrants, non-natives, which both imply an anti-pluralist viewpoint). We do not claim that this is a complete list of antagonists. However, we contend that it captures many of the motivations associated with actors campaigning on a populist platform, as highlighted in the literature. We also explore the impact of people attracted to a strong leader who will shake up the system (e.g. Bos *et al.*, 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008), which taps into the idea of politicians who "know the people…who make their wishes come true" (Mudde 2004, p.558) even if it means challenging the conventional wisdom, thus mapping onto the *volonté générale* dimension of populism.

We explore the impact of populism on vote choice in the American presidential and Irish general elections of 2016. Three things motivate our focus on Ireland and the US. First, we take a diverse case study approach (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016) and explore two cases that have received much less attention than other countries in the populism literature, a departure from the conventional case study approach which explores more likely cases. By incorporating more macro diversity, fresh insights might be offered. Second, we focus on comparative election study data and are among the first to use the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5 battery of questions tapping populism, which allows us to estimate a comprehensive vote choice model. This circumvents many of the drawbacks of using non-election data identified earlier. Crucially, the same questions are asked of respondents in both countries. An additional boon is that it also allows us to put the election of Donald Trump into a comparative context. Third, both elections were held in 2016, at what we might consider the height of the populist wave. Moreover, as Ireland and the US pre-2016 would not have been conventionally thought of as typical places for populist voting to take hold, they offer solid ground to test the plausibility of the Populist Wave thesis. If populism is impacting vote choice in both these states, support for the populist wave proposition will be strengthened. If not or it is outshone by other factors, the importance of populism to voters globally might need to be re-evaluated.

Our results show that populist sentiments did motivate some voters in both countries, but that different tenets stimulated a populist vote in each state. This implies some support for the idea of a populist wave as populist tenets shaped vote choice. However, in both countries, the old reliables – economic perceptions,

partisanship, and ideological positions – had a much more significant impact on voters than did populism, implying that while populism mattered in 2016, it perhaps did not influence voters as much as conventional wisdom suggests. More fundamentally, the results resurrect questions about populism's status as an ideology.

## II THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

### 2.1 Defining Populism

Populism is a challenging concept to classify. In the literature explicitly devoted to populism, Mudde first articulated the current hegemonic definition. He maintains that populism is "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Building on Freeden (1998), Mudde (2004, pp. 543-4) classifies populism as a 'thin-centred ideology' as opposed to a thick-centred ideology such as liberalism or socialism, that can be combined with other host ideologies (be they thick or thin). At the core of populism is "the people: … a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population" (*ibid*, p. 544) that is virtuous, homogeneous, and pure. Elites, on the other hand, are harmful enemies of the people (a Manichean worldview). Pluralism also features as an opposite of populism's homogeneity – arguably opening the way for a more extensive range of host ideologies. Nevertheless, this base definition confines the core of populism to the pure people, the corrupt elite, and the concept of *volonté générale* (also see Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).

Mudde (2004) intends his definition to provide a solid foundation for empirical research. Yet, while it is widely cited, many authors stretch it – sometimes significantly. Views especially differ on whether populism constitutes an ideology – even a 'thin' one – with some arguing that it is better defined as a discursive frame (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016). Such framing can involve strategic politicisation of citizens' discontents by political actors (Hawkins *et al*., 2019), but may include instances where normative assumptions of opportunism may not be especially valid (Aslanidis, 2016).

Others argue that the range of "the people's" antagonists goes beyond politicians and can include legal elites, powerful business interests, the media, immigrants, or cultural or religious groups frowned on by nativists within a given society (Canovan, 1999). Variation in the profile of populism derived from this range of potential mutual antipathies has been likened to the chameleon (Taggart 2000),[1] with some suggesting that populism can contain various subtypes

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[1] This small carnivorous reptile changes its colour dramatically to maintain camouflage as it moves through its immediate environment, while remaining the same animal under its skin.

depending on the left-right ideological disposition of the actor framing the populist message (e.g. March, 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). While scholars differ as to how fundamental the difference between subtypes is, the critical point is that such research highlights the conditioning effect of context regarding how populism can evolve.

The role of context brings to the forefront the relationship between populism and host ideologies. Some scholars have explored triggers of populism such as nationalism, immigration, and leadership style and rhetoric (Bos *et al*., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008; de Koster *et al*., 2013; Zhirkov, 2014), building on issues highlighted by Mudde himself (2004, p.547-8). More recently, however, a purist view has emerged in the populist literature that attempts to re-focus solely on the three core aspects of populism (e.g. Akkermann *et al*., 2014). This narrower paradigm focuses exclusively on 'the people' (and its *volonté générale*) and its antagonism towards political elites and the idea that politics is a moral struggle between good and evil. This view insists that host ideologies remain distinct from populism itself and that any attempt to constitute 'the people' in ways other than in opposition to a corrupt political elite is misguided, despite acknowledging that populist subtypes exist (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).

With respect to voting, the purist view is that populist attitudes, narrowly conceived in the frame of 'the people' versus the elite, shapes voting behavior (e.g. Akkerman *et al*., 2014). Moreover, despite accepting that populism can be taken up by actors on the left and right of the political divide, they insist that this purist definition can stand as an ideology. However, the lack of cohesion of the concept is one ground for challenging the claim that populism is an ideology, with several scholars disputing this classification (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski and Gidron, 2016). Most empirical scholarship has tended to gloss over this controversial issue. However, as more empirical data become available, we can explore whether similar tenets matter in different contexts. If populism is indeed an ideology, we should see that it achieves coherence cross-nationally (Gerring, 1997). For coherence, one expectation would be the same populist tenets influence voting no matter the context. If this is not met, it would emphasise that host ideologies are fundamentally important to the study of populism, that antagonists of "the people" are not merely politicians but could be from the wider community, and that populism on its own would fail to meet the requirements to be considered an ideology.

In the vein of Mudde's definition, we accept that anti-elitism is a core of populism and hence we incorporate a measure of it into our analysis. However, our definition of populism goes beyond this 'purist' view. We strongly advocate that context is likely to determine how actors will characterise the nemeses and thus the link with the host ideology is crucial because it is essential for defining 'the people' and its enemies. Consequently, and in line with other scholarship (e.g. Southwell *et al*., 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016), our definition also includes a wider range of antagonists. Therefore, we explore antipathy of 'the people' towards out-groups

like immigrants and non-natives, as well as examining the importance of leadership style, and their impact on vote choice.

## 2.2 Populism and the Vote

Beyond the populist literature, existing scholarship on electoral behavior has highlighted protest voting – a vote cast to scare the elite and which is not policy driven (van der Brug *et al.*, 2000); and the increasing importance of parties that challenge the mainstream consensus, reject centrism, and champion niche or 'new' issues. The latter strand of study has led to the development of several taxonomies to explain the rejection of traditional political actors, including challenger parties (e.g. Hino 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2016), niche parties (e.g. Adams *et al.*, 2006; Wagner 2012), and some describing such actors as populists (e.g. Mudde 2007). There is obvious cross-over between populism and these other classifications. Protest voting and support for those embracing a populist agenda are linked, as both involve a rejection of the political establishment. Research has demonstrated that voting for populists is in part due to such political discontent (e.g. Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Rooduijn *et al.*, 2016). Meanwhile, actors standing on a populist platform reject consensus and the existing political order, adopt more extreme positions, and stress new issues; hallmarks of challenger and niche parties (Wagner 2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Hence, no matter the terminology, all these concepts emphasise the rejection of politics as it is now, and thus it might be that populism with respect to electoral behavior constitutes nothing new. What makes populism stand out is its denunciation of the elite, especially politicians, but also its discontent with pluralism, and the *volonté générale* aspect of its outlook (Mudde, 2004), hence our focus on it.

Studies of populism taking voters as the unit of analysis can be broadly divided into three strands, although some explore multiple aspects simultaneously. The first strand focuses on how best populist sentiments among citizens can be measured (e.g. Akkerman *et al.*, 2014; Schulz *et al.*, 2017). The second strand concentrates on which voters are more likely to hold populist views, with personality traits, gender differences, and attitudes to protest all influential regarding who has populist sentiments and who does not (Bakker *et al.*, 2016; Rooduijn *et al.*, 2016; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017). The third strand, and the one we focus on, investigates voters' populist attitudes and their impact on the vote. Akkermann *et al.* (2014) take a purist conception of populism and demonstrate that holding a variety of 'populist' attitudes correlates with an intention to vote for both right and left-populist parties in the Netherlands. Others have highlighted the importance to vote choice of the propinquity of the policy position of a party standing on a populist platform to the voter's policy position (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013). Indeed, there is a clear connection between policy issues, such as immigration for Vlaams Belang in Belgium (Pauwels, 2011), or Euroscepticism for UKIP in Britain (Ford *et al.*, 2011) and Podemos in Spain

(Ramiro and Gomez, 2017), and support for so-called populist actors. Yet Rooduijn (2018) challenges the premise that there is any unifying basis constituting support for actors embracing populism cross-nationally. Another aspect of the literature has noted the class dimension of support for radical right parties in particular, many of which embrace populism, noting that these actors obtain more support from the working class compared with the middle class (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018), with support emanating from a desire to protect national identity from outsiders (e.g. Oesch, 2008), or from the lack of labor market opportunities for certain groups (e.g. Kriesi *et al*., 2012; Beramendi *et al*., 2018).

However gaps remain. Most of the above studies rely on countries that have 'classic' populist parties in situ. Our research focuses on a more diverse set of cases without typical populist actors in place prior to 2016. Moreover, a comparison of these two cases with one another helps us to detect the presence of the so-called populist wave supposedly sweeping electoral politics globally. Meanwhile, comparative studies, while evolving, remain few. Also, existing studies have tended to overlook attitudes to nativism and a strong leader who will bend the rules. Our study tests these two critical dimensions along with the more conventional populist measures: anti-elitism; and one of the main policy issues populist actors have campaigned on, namely anti-immigration sentiments.

### 2.2.1 *Desire for a strong leader who will bend the rules*

There is a burgeoning literature showing that leaders influence vote choice, be it through their likeability (e.g. Costa-Lobo and Curtice, 2015), their personal attributes (e.g. Bean and Mughan, 1989), their performance in television debates (Pattie and Johnston, 2011), or their policy positions. In the first instance, for populist voting to take hold, there needs to be an option for voters to turn to – a political entrepreneur. This often manifests itself in the form of an attractive leader, an issue which Mudde highlights in his seminal article (Mudde, 2004, pp. 545-7, 556-8). He says: "citizens first and foremost want leadership. They want politicians 'who 'know' (rather than listen to) the people and who make their wishes come true" (Mudde 2004, p.558). The 'strong leader who will bend the rules' dimension reaches beyond the idea of a merely charismatic leader to one who will implement the *volonté générale* of the people even if it means riding rough-shod over established practices.

The charismatic populist leader portrays himself as a crisis manager reluctantly getting involved in politics to tackle the mess created by established politicians, while nevertheless remaining an ordinary, straight-talking man of the people (Taggart, 2000). Such leaders are easy to think of: Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen in France, Alexis Tsipras in Greece, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela – the list goes on. They dramatise the harm that is being done to 'the people', heightening tension between citizens and established politicians (Albertazzi, 2007). Through their rhetoric of challenging the status quo, they attract media attention to

their cause (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) and appeal to lower educated, less politically efficacious voters (Bos *et al*., 2013). This 'outsider' leader will sweep all the dross away from 'politics as normal', where elites fail to uphold the will of the people, greatly improving the existence of the ordinary citizen ('Us') at the expense of those currently favored ('Them') (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). We recognise that a charismatic leader alone is not a sufficient condition to lead to populist voting (Muis and Immerzeel, 2016). Instead, we believe that actors presenting themselves as a strong leader *'who will bend the rules'* go beyond mere charisma or voting for the leader. It is a particular trait the leader is promising to embrace and we posit that people who find such a style appealing might be more inclined to vote populist. Thus, we assume that:

> *H1: The more voters express a desire for a strong leader who will bend the rules, the greater the probability that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist platform*

### 2.2.2 *Anti-Political Elite Attitudes*

Purist conceptions of populism privilege anti-elitism. In the words of Mudde (2004, p.543), 'the corrupt elite' is the sole antagonist of 'the virtuous people'. Elitism is 'the mirror image' of populism (Akkerman *et al*., 2014; Bakker *et al*., 2016). Parties seeking to tackle corruption in government should not necessarily be labeled populist (Hanley and Sikk, 2016), nor is an anti-elitist stance necessary for a populist party to flourish (Ivarsflaten, 2008). However, anti-elitism is conventionally accepted as a critical pillar of populist motivations and thus any discussion of populism should incorporate it.

This tenet complements the 'desire for a strong leader who will bend the rules' by focusing on the makers of those rules. Here we have an antagonistic, homogeneous group – 'the political elite' – which threatens 'the people' and which is evil. Established politicians are blamed for all the problems besetting a country. Failure to resolve these stems not just from incompetence, but from dereliction of their duty to care about the lives of the voters who elected them, and a selfish interest to please the rich and powerful who will reward them well. The relationship between voters and established politicians is dramatised as a battle between good and evil (Akkerman *et al*., 2014). A voter who seeks 'real change' may support a new kind of politician who comes from outside the establishment and promises to shake up the system and look after the deserving ordinary man in the street. Thus, in the tradition of the purist conception of populism, if populist voting is emerging, we assume that:

> *H2: The more voters express anti-elitist sentiments, the higher the probability that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist platform*

### 2.2.3 *Anti-immigrant sentiment*

An anti-immigration stance does not necessarily indicate populism as there can be genuine economic concerns motivating dislike of migration. However, once anti-immigrant sentiment is couched in terms of the 'worthy' people versus the 'wicked' migrant, it comes within the purview of populism. Such negativity towards immigration is the single policy position that united populist parties of the right that achieved electoral success in Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008), and it continues to be a familiar refrain of populist campaigns (Bohman, 2015). Parties of the left can also take a negative stance towards immigration where anti-immigration views attain salience in election campaigns (van Spanje, 2010). The theoretical basis for connecting this kind of anti-immigration stance to populism emerges from the fact that pluralism is a direct opposite of populism and 'rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism' (Mudde, 2004, p.544). A key dimension of pluralism is that 'pluralists are accommodating to diversity and a plurality of voices' (Akkermann *et al.*, 2014, p. 1331). Pluralism accepts that society is made up of different groups and consequently, the political will should be reflective of society's multiple preferences (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 152), instead of the *volonté générale* of the homogeneous people. Indeed, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p. 152) acknowledge, "the term 'pluralism' has increasingly been used to refer to ethnic, cultural, or religious groups, usually in a fashion that advocates wide latitude for such minorities." Hence, it follows that Manichean negativity regarding immigrants involves a rejection of pluralism, and thus its link to populism.

Negativity towards immigrants manifests itself in concerns regarding increasing crime, threats to national security and jobs, as well as undermining national culture, and putting a strain on the welfare system (Zaslove, 2004). Immigration creates winners and losers among different socioeconomic groups in society (Gabel, 1998), thus stoking anti-immigrant sentiment, especially among less educated citizens, who are more receptive to rhetorical attacks on migrants (Bos *et al.*, 2013). Hence, we posit that:

> *H3: The more voters express anti-immigrant sentiments the greater the probability that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist platform*

### 2.2.4 *Nativist Attitudes*

Nativism is often conflated with anti-immigration sentiment and the two attitudes can undoubtedly intersect. Nativism involves interconnected ideas about society, the past, and the future, and who can lay claim to a nationality (Knobel, 1996). Traditions are considered to flow from a shared folk history that should be accepted by all who come to live in this society. Assimilation is not enough; there is implied supremacy of people who can trace their forebears back in time, and should be favored over people who lack these characteristics.

There has been some difference in the way nativism has developed in America and Europe,[2] although by now the two strands are very similar. Arguments that other cultures were 'equal but different'; and that each belonged in its place which deserved protection from dilution, paved the way for electoral breakthroughs by parties campaigning on a populist platform in Europe from the 1970s onwards (e.g. Rydgren, 2005). The link between nativism and populism is controversial. Mudde (2004, p. 549) acknowledges that "the step from 'the nation' to 'the people' is easily taken, and the distinction between the two is often far from clear", going on to show that populist rightist parties drum up support on this issue (also see Mudde, 2007). Yet, he goes on to argue that as nativism is linked to conceptions of the nation-state (*ibid*, p. 19), its definition of 'the people' is entirely different from the definition of 'the people' in a populist sense, and thus "populism functions at best as a fuzzy blanket to camouflage the nastier nativism" (Mudde, 2017). However, given that pluralism, the antithesis of populism, involves the need to accommodate diversity and does not prioritise one group over another, it is hard not to conclude that nativists are anti-pluralists, and thus a link with populism, at least as a host ideology, is plausible. We maintain that nativism can act as a host ideology as it *can* involve antagonism toward other groups of people which are distinct from 'the native people' and can lead to the development of an 'us versus them' conception that is Manichean.

Immigrants undoubtedly do become targets for nativist ire under some conditions. An economic downturn can trigger a sense that 'natives' deserve more protection than other groups in society. However, nativism can manifest itself in other forms. Some 'out' groups may be more unwelcome than others; some may be of quite long standing within society. Others may even emerge from the ranks of 'the people' to espouse cosmopolitan, multicultural ideas that nativists regard as damaging to national identity (Galindo and Vigil, 2006; Hellstrøm and Hervik, 2014). This leads to our fourth hypothesis:

> *H4: The more voters express nativist sentiments the greater the probability that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist platform*

## III  CASE SELECTION

We chose the United States and Ireland to study for several reasons. First,the existing literature on populism and vote choice on the demand side concentrates on a small number of states, notably the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, where actors embracing a populist platform have been successful over time

[2] The American meaning of nativism did not encompass the sense of an inherent biological trait that was evident in fascism in Europe. In post WWII Europe, proponents of xenophobia remained on the margins politically for years.

(e.g. Akkerman *et al*., 2014; Helms, 1997; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Spruyt *et al.*, 2016; Rooduijn *et al*., 2016). While studies of other states such as Greece and Spain are becoming more prominent (e.g. Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Stavrakakis *et al.*, 2016), for the most part the existing literature remains firmly focused on studies of polities which are distinctly alike, namely continental European multi-party parliamentary systems using proportional electoral systems. While comparative studies embracing more country diversity do exist (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018), for the most part, the populist vote literature remains open to the critique that it is heavily reliant on studies of most likely cases. What is required is to go beyond studying most likely cases. Hence, our contribution takes a diverse case study approach (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016) by focusing on two cases: Ireland and the United States. They are different from the cases conventionally explored in the literature as, prior to 2016, neither had an actor actively articulating a populist rhetoric. Moreover, the United States is a Presidential system, a departure from most of the existing research. And while Ireland boasts the hallmarks of multi-party European democracy, its use of the STV electoral system and the fact it has lacked for the most part a radical right party (O'Malley, 2008) means it stands aside from the conventional cases explored in the populist literature. In sum, our focus on these two diverse cases vis-à-vis the usual suspect cases is deliberate and enhances the macro variation on tests of populism's impact on the vote.

Second, while a focus on one or two states would be insufficient to thoroughly test the worldwide populist wave thesis, our study in this respect acts as a plausibility probe (Levy, 2008). This involves testing the assumption that populism is conditioning vote choice in a small number of cases, cases which deviate from the conventional cases explored, before more extensive analyses are undertaken. In the vein of Sinatra's "if I can make it there I can make it anywhere" (Levy, 2008, p. 12), Ireland and the United States are quite distinct in their political and economic cultures, ranging from different political rules through different levels of partisanship in each state (see Appendix Table D.10 for more). Our strategy of selecting cases that are distinct from one another is meticulous, as our goal is to establish whether common mechanisms – namely whether the same populist sentiments correlate with vote in very different contextual circumstances – exist. In sum, if we see populist sentiments conditioning the vote in Ireland and the US, two diverse cases from one another, arguments for the existence of a populist wave will be more justified.

Third, populist voting in both countries has received less attention than the most likely cases (for exceptions see Bakker *et al*., 2016; Guardino and Snyder, 2012; O'Malley and Fitzgibbon, 2015; Marsh *et al.* 2018). And yet despite the apparent differences between the two states, the political context in 2016 was similar on a number of fronts. We saw the rejection of the political establishment: in Ireland the

vote of the three traditional parties – Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour – dropped to its lowest share ever (Farrell and Suiter, 2016); while in the United States, a political novice defeated 15 other established candidates in the Republican primary. Moreover, trust in various political institutions was exceptionally low in both states (Eurobarometer Standard Report, 2016; Pew Research Centre, 2017). Attacks on the so-called political elite were commonplace. In Ireland, still reeling from an EU/IMF bailout during the Global Financial Crisis, anti-establishment parties Sinn Féin (a party with strong paramilitary associations), and the Anti-Austerity Alliance, as well as independents, reaped the electoral benefits. Meanwhile, in the US, Donald Trump's tirades against political elites – with calls to "drain the swamp" and slurs of "Crooked Hillary" – were ceaseless. In sum, the electoral context in both polities lent itself to populist voting emerging and with these dissimilar countries both holding elections in 2016, when the populist wave was said to be at a new peak, we assert these countries offer an ideal testing ground for our assumptions, especially as the same questions were asked of respondents in both countries in an election study setting.

Some critics might argue that in choosing Ireland and the United States, which have heterogeneous parties and candidates, we are merely tapping into ideological subtypes of populism, and thus different individual motivations for a populist vote are inevitable. However, this is to miss the point of our investigation. The populist wave thesis assumes that the same motivations are driving voter choice globally regardless of context. In addition, the theoretical discussion on populism generally assumes that it is an ideology, albeit a thin one, with the acknowledgment of subtypes a relatively recent phenomenon (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Moreover, this contention assumes that specific motivations map precisely on to left or right. We do not share this assumption. For example, anti-elitism can be expected to inform both left and right wing populist platforms. Attitudes to EU integration have also drawn the ire of both populists on the left and right. Further, an anti-immigration stance, traditionally associated with candidates of the right has also been taken up by some on the left (van Spanje, 2010). Additionally, purist conceptions of populism assume that anti-elitism is the essential ingredient of populism with other "nemeses of the people" taking a back seat. If these pillars hold up, namely that populism is something which we can talk of as a unified phenomenon with anti-elitism the common denominator of motivations, we should observe these stimuli influence the vote no matter the context.

## IV  DATA AND METHODS

### 4.1 Data

Our data comes from two sources. The US data are from the American National Election Study (ANES) 2016 Time Series File (2017). For Ireland, we use the 2016 Irish National Election Study (INES) (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). These data are unified

by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5, meaning identical questions on populism were posed to respondents.

The 2016 ANES had two independently drawn probability components of eligible American voters: a face-to-face sample and an online sample.[3] It yielded an initial N of 3,647 respondents, which reduced to 2,452 because of abstention and item non-response. The 2016 Irish National Election Study was a random probability post-election study conducted by telephone. It yielded an initial N of 1,000 respondents, which reduced to 785 because of abstention and item non-response.

### 4.2 Variable Operationalisation and Modeling Strategy

Our dependent variable is vote choice. For the United States, we focus on the Presidential election and categorise Republican Party nominee Donald Trump as a candidate that stood on a populist platform.[4] For Ireland, we build on a consensus that Sinn Féin has embraced many of the hallmarks of the populist platform (see O'Malley, 2008; O'Malley and Fitzgibbon, 2015).[5] Additionally, we classify the Anti-Austerity Alliance/People Before Profit (AAA) as a party that espoused populist views calling for a 'political revolution' in its manifesto.[6] Its rhetoric highlighted anti-elitism, "sweetheart deals for big business", and its candidates were prominent in many of the campaigns against austerity.[7] For comparability, our dependent variable is dichotomous and captures a vote for a party/candidate standing on a populist platform versus all others, and thus we opt for logit models.[8]

The measurement of populism has received greater attention in recent years (e.g. Akkerman *et al.*, 2014; Schulz *et al.*, 2017). All incorporate what we refer to as a purist dimension (Akkermann *et al.*, 2014, p. 1331). The CSES has three such measures. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement/disagreement on a five-point Likert scale to the following statements: (a) "politicians are the main

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[3] For robustness, we estimated our American models excluding the online component and found similar results to those reported (see Appendix Table D.7).

[4] For robustness, we re-estimated our models with vote for the Republican Party as the dependent variable and we found similar results to those reported with the exception that nativism only correlated with a vote for Trump (see Table Appendix D.5).

[5] Further, Sinn Féin's 2016 manifesto (p.10 and p.30) highlights much of what we would expect from a party campaigning on a populist platform including "taking on the golden circles and vested interests" and critiques that "cronyism is alive and well in Fine Gael and the Labour Party".

[6] Some might challenge combining Sinn Féin and the AAA together. However, the number of voters that report supporting the AAA is low and robustness checks show our results do not change with the inclusion of the AAA.

[7] Some scholars have noted that some non-party candidates in Ireland embrace a populist platform. While we believe there is merit to this, classifying all non-party candidates on this basis would be incorrect as many build their success on localism. It is impossible to disentangle independents from one another in the data at our disposal.

[8] For robustness, we estimate our models on other parties/candidates too – see Table D.2 and D.3 for Ireland and Table D.6 for America.

problem in the country"; (b) "politicians don't care about the people"; and (c) "politicians only care about the rich and powerful". The first two CSES measures are designed to tap negative attitudes to the elite in Manichean terms. The third focuses specifically on whether they privilege the rich and powerful (see Hobolt *et al.*, 2016). These measures are similar to those of Akkermann *et al.*, 2014 and Schulz *et al.*, 2017, which place some emphasis on politicians and critiques of politicians as working against 'the people'. Thus, we maintain that the CSES anti-elitist measures are functionally equivalent to the other studies. From our three anti-elitist questions, we constructed an index (see Appendix B for more details).

Our study also taps other nemeses of 'the people' by looking at related tenets measured by the CSES. To tap the impact of charismatic leaders who will shake up the system, a respondent's agreement/disagreement on a 5-point scale was sought to the following statement: "Having a strong leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done". To examine respondents' opposition to pluralism, which is in direct contrast to populism, we assess their attitudes to out-groups. The first such group is immigrants. Respondents were asked agreement/disagreement on a five-point Likert scale with the statements: "Immigrants are generally good for COUNTRY's economy", and "COUNTRY's culture is generally harmed by immigrants". Our other measures of attitudes towards out-groups asked respondents the extent of importance they attach to three things associated with nativism, namely: the importance of "being able to speak the country's national language", the importance of "having the nation's ancestry", and the importance of being "born in the country". [9]

We take a conservative modeling strategy and control for partisanship, left-right ideology, and economic perceptions.[10] We also include measures of age, education, sex, and region of residence. The operationalisation of the variables is detailed in Appendix A, and we provide summary statistics and scaling analysis in Appendix B.

## V  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We begin by exploring the extent of populist attitudes in both states. Figure 1 details voters' desire for a strong leader who bends the rules to get things done, their attitudes towards politicians, their views on immigration, and the extent of their nativist sentiments. We see there are mixed views in both states about a strong

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[9] The principal component analysis in America identified only two factors. While the immigration and nativist measures scaled together, for theoretical reasons and to ensure maximum comparability, we created two separate indexes (see Appendix Table B.4).

[10] Some might argue that the inclusion of partisanship is too conservative. For robustness, we re-estimate our models by omitting partisanship and do not find any significant deviations from the analysis reported in text (see Appendix Tables D.1 and D.4).

leader who bends the rules to get things done. There is stronger support for the proposition in Ireland, with 48 per cent of voters agreeing, whereas only 37 per cent of US voters did so. Conversely, there is opposition, with 44 per cent of US voters disagreeing, and 46 per cent of Irish voters saying likewise.

**Figure 1: Populist Sentiments Among Voters in Ireland and the United States 2016 (%)**



*Source:* (ANES, 2017; Marsh *et al*., 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. Stacked bars may not equal 100 per cent because of rounding.

Anti-politician sentiment was stronger in America. Forty-five per cent of voters expressed some level of anti-politician feeling whereas only 33 per cent of Irish voters did so. Meanwhile, 43 per cent of Irish voters expressed a favorable view towards politicians while in the US this was 16 per cent. Figure 1 shows that in both Ireland and the United States, anti-immigrant sentiments are confined to a small segment of voters. Only 11 per cent of Americans and 9 per cent of Irish voters expressed strong anti-immigrant views. The prevailing view on this subject was that immigrants made a positive contribution: 63 per cent of Irish voters and 48 per cent of American voters thought this. Regarding nativism, 62 per cent of US voters said it was fairly or very important while support for the proposition in Ireland, although less, was still substantial at 45 per cent. In sum, populist sentiments were permeating the Irish and American electorates with anti-politician

feelings in both states extensive, nativism important, and significant proportions of voters in both states willing to support the emergence of a strong leader who bends the rules to get things done. The critical question is whether these sentiments influence vote choice in a meaningful way. We present the bivariate relationships in Figure 2. The evidence from America is more promising regarding the idea that these sentiments correlate with support for parties/candidates standing on a populist platform. Those who agree with the premise of having a strong leader who bends the rules to get things done vote in higher numbers for Mr Trump. In Ireland however, there is no discernible relationship between this view and support for SF/AAA. Mr Trump also harvested more support from voters who were anti-immigrant. Seventy-eight and 80 per cent of voters respectively who held somewhat or strong anti-immigrant views supported him, compared with only 8 per cent who held strongly pro-immigrant sentiments. In Ireland however, the relationship was absent, although SF/AAA did draw more support from voters who said they fervently opposed immigrants. Mr Trump also drew more support from voters who thought nativism was important (60 per cent supported Mr Trump, whereas he gained only 6 per cent support among those who said it was "not at all important"). However, such a pattern is not visible in Ireland.

**Figure 2: Populist Sentiments and Vote Choice in the 2016 Irish General Election and the 2016 US Presidential Election**



*Source:* (ANES, 2017; Marsh *et al*., 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents.

More promising is the pattern in Ireland about anti-elite views. Voters who expressed greater anti-politician feeling voted more for Sinn Féin/AAA. Seven per cent of Irish voters who said they had no anti-politician feeling reported voting for SF/AAA compared with 35 per cent who had strong anti-politician sentiment. In America, Donald Trump also drew more support from voters who felt dissatisfaction with politicians, although the effect was much less (a 7-point difference).

But to stand on firmer ground, a multivariate strategy is required (see Tables 1 for Ireland and 2 for the US). Model I contains the fundamentals of vote choice and sociodemographics. Not surprisingly, for both states, it shows that partisanship is a crucial determinant of support for both Mr Trump and Sinn Féin/AAA. Moreover, ideology was a strong determinant too: the more right a voter was in the United States, the higher the probability that they voted for Mr Trump. The more left a voter in Ireland, the greater the chance they opted for SF/AAA. Economic perceptions were omnipresent too. When voters perceived the economy to have performed poorly in both America and Ireland, they were more likely to have opted for Mr Trump and SF/AAA.

To these base models, we add the four so-called populist sentiments.

**Table 1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election**

| | I-IE | II-IE | III-IE | IV-IE | V-IE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance | | | | | |
| Attached to Sinn Féin | 5.088*** | 5.091*** | 4.937*** | 5.110*** | 5.178*** |
| | (0.520) | (0.521) | (0.516) | (0.523) | (0.531) |
| Ideology | –0.252*** | –0.245** | –0.232** | –0.246** | –0.242** |
| | (0.071) | (0.072) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.071) |
| Retrospective economy | –0.490*** | –0.484** | –0.263 | –0.505** | –0.506** |
| | (0.170) | (0.170) | (0.181) | (0.171) | (0.171) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | –0.049 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.101) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | | 0.459** | – | – |
| | | | (0.144) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | | – | –0.103 | – |
| | | | | (0.159) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | | – | – | –0.269 |
| | | | | | (0.192) |
| N | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | –169.40 | –169.28 | –164.17 | –169.19 | –168.40 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.479 | 0.480 | 0.495 | 0.480 | 0.482 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Demographic variables not displayed. Full model available in Table C.1 in Appendix.

Model II tests whether voters who desired a strong leader that bends the rules to get things done resulted in a higher likelihood of supporting parties/candidates standing on a populist platform. In Ireland, we find no indication that such feelings increased the chances of supporting SF/AAA. In America, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (p=0.042). However, when we tease this out by estimating the predicted probabilities, the effect is very modest (a 6 point increase in the likelihood of supporting Mr Trump from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Considering the significant cross-over in confidence intervals, at best we can deduce weak support for H1. Coupled with the lack of evidence for such an effect in Ireland, we infer that this tenet had little sway.

**Table 2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I-US | II-US | III-US | IV-US | V-US |
| Attached to GOP | 3.058*** | 3.051*** | 3.060*** | 3.109*** | 3.106*** |
| | (0.181) | (0.182) | (0.181) | (0.194) | (0.190) |
| Ideology | 0.258*** | 0.250*** | 0.258*** | 0.212*** | 0.220*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.038) | (0.037) |
| Retrospective economy | −0.835*** | −0.841*** | −0.834*** | −0.743*** | −0.802*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.070) | (0.065) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.126* | – | – | – |
| | | (0.057) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | – | 0.010 | – | – |
| | | | (0.085) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | – | – | 0.757*** | – |
| | | | | (0.087) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | – | – | – | 0.489*** |
| | | | | | (0.086) |
| N | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 |
| N Strata/PSU | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 |
| F and (Prob > F) | (6, 128) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) |
| | 132.34*** | 115.19*** | 115.34*** | 104.34*** | 111.74*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Demographic variables not displayed. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook. Full model available in Table C.2 in Appendix.

Model III tests our anti-politician hypothesis. It shows that the more Irish voters held anti-elite sentiments, the higher the likelihood of supporting either Sinn Féin or AAA. The difference in the probability of supporting them is about ten points

(see Appendix Figure C.1). However, and perhaps surprisingly considering the tenor of the campaign, we find no evidence that these sentiments correlate with the likelihood of backing Donald Trump. Our results again suggest heterogeneity. Anti-elite sentiment was an essential ingredient in the support base of parties standing on a populist platform in Ireland. However, this did not transfer to the US. Thus, we conclude modest support for H2: macro heterogeneity reigns supreme.

Model IV in the United States shows negative attitudes toward immigration strongly correlated with support for Donald Trump. It shows that the more unenthusiastic an American voter was about immigration, the more likely they were to support Mr Trump. Support for him among people who held favorable views towards immigrants was 30 per cent, but this rises to 70 per cent among those who are most fierce against immigration (see Appendix Figure C.2). However, we must keep the extent of this effect in context. Few voters in America held vehemently anti-immigrant attitudes and thus the number of votes Mr Trump harvested from this issue is not likely to have been excessive. In Ireland, a different picture emerges. We find no evidence of an association between attitudes towards immigration and a vote for parties standing on a populist platform. Again, unconditional support for the idea that similar tenets of populism drive support for parties and candidates espousing a populist platform is not borne out. Instead, we conclude mixed support for H3.

Turning to our nativist hypothesis, the analysis once again points to macro heterogeneity. In America, Model V shows that voters who believed nativism was important were substantially more likely to vote for Donald Trump. Teasing this out, among voters for whom nativism was not at all salient, there was a 34 per cent likelihood of supporting him (see Appendix Figure C.3). It steadily rises the more salient nativist feelings become, peaking at a 51 per cent likelihood of supporting Mr Trump among those who believe nativism is very important. Given that most US voters considered nativist feelings important, this suggests that Mr Trump garnered a significant quantity of votes from this issue. Yet, in Ireland, its role is negligible. We deduce diverse support for H4 – again illustrating macro heterogeneity.

## VI CONCLUSION

In terms of theoretical debates within the literature explicitly devoted to populism, we note that if the purist definition of populism (i.e. anti-elitism) is accepted, our evidence suggests that populism only featured in the Irish case, thus undermining the idea of a global populist wave. However, we posit that this narrow conceptualisation risks missing essential dimensions where strong sentiments regarding a perceived nemesis motivated voters. In the American case, intense feelings of nativism in many voters *were* prominent in the outcome. Hence, we

suggest that the broader conceptualisation of populism that we subscribe to provides a more thorough understanding of vote choice and populism in these elections. One of our significant results is that different tenets of populism mattered in each state, consonant with typical findings in the literature. For the populist wave idea, speaking of populism's impact on the vote in normal terms conceals the different motivations underlying the success of candidates standing on a populist platform in different states. In sum, while there is support for the premise of populism shaping the vote, a more nuanced view of the populist wave idea is required.

Our results also speak to the ongoing debate about the conceptualisation of populism as an ideology. How much unity is there to the concept of 'the people' when motivations for support of a populist candidate differ depending on context? The change to the chameleon across our cases appears to run more than skin deep, possibly turning a carnivore into a vegetarian. Such a degree of metamorphosis challenges the argument that populism is sufficiently coherent to qualify as an ideology. Explaining this away by arguing that we have merely identified left-and right-wing populism misses the point that acceptance of this variation undermines the overall coherence of populism as an ideology. We embrace this variation as part of populism but argue that glossing over the importance of it in underlying motivations involves too high a retreat up the ladder of abstraction. Instead, our research suggests that host ideologies have an essential role to play in the relationship between populism and the vote, and need to be factored in. This moves us beyond arguments about whether populism is an ideology and allows us to focus on the pertinent subject of how context conditions the evolution of populism.

Finally, our analysis shows that populist sentiments shaped vote choice in both Ireland and America – neither country traditionally associated with populism, enhancing the plausibility of the idea of a populist wave. However, we need to recognise that the usual suspects of partisanship, left-right ideology, and perceptions about the economy mattered more. In sum, populism mattered, but not as much as conventional wisdom might suggest, or as is implied by the populist wave premise. For the most part, we did not see a fundamental redefinition of the issues upon which the elections were decided. This implies that extending the focus to diverse cases is a useful strategy to avoid the risk of overestimating the importance of populist sentiments on the vote more generally.

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## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A: VARIABLE CLASSIFICATIONS AND SURVEY QUESTIONS

***US: Vote for Donald Trump***
***Ireland: Vote for Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance***
This variable measures whether or not a respondent gave their first preference vote to Sinn Féin and the Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish general election or voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election. This is ascertained from variable Q12P1 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162034a in ANES.

***Strong leader in govt is good for country even if leader bends the rules to get things done***
This variable measures a respondent's attitude to a strong leader in government being good for the country, even if the leader bends the rules to get things done. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:
*Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? "Having a strong leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done".*
This is ascertained from variable Q4_5 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162263 in ANES.

***Anti-Politician Sentiments***
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt positive or negative towards politicians. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative). This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see Appendix B). The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:
*Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement?*

- *Most politicians do not care about the people.*
- *Politicians are the main problem in [COUNTRY].*
- *Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.*

This is ascertained from variable Q4_2, Q4_4, and Q4_7 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162260, V162262, and V162265 in ANES.

***Anti-Immigration Sentiments***
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt positive or negative towards

immigrants. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative). This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see Appendix B). The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:

*Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement?*

• *Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY]'s economy.*
• *[COUNTRY]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.*

This is ascertained from variable Q5A and Q5B in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162268 and V162269 in ANES.

### Nativist Sentiments
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt nativism was important or not. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important). This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see Appendix B). The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:

*How important do you think the following is for being truly [NATIONALITY]: 1) very important; 2) fairly important; 3) not very important; 4) Not important at all?*

• *To have been born in [COUNTRY].*
• *To have [NATIONALITY] ancestry.*
• *To be able to speak [COUNTRY NATIONAL LANGUAGES].*

This is ascertained from variable Q6_1, Q6_3, and Q6_7 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162271, V162272, and V162273 in ANES.

### Age
This variable measures a respondent's age in years. This is ascertained from variable D01 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V161267 in ANES.

### University Education
This variable measures whether a respondent has university level education or not. This is ascertained from variable D03 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V161270 in ANES. University educated respondents are coded as 1 while others are coded as 0.

### Female
This variable measures whether a respondent was female or not. This is ascertained from variable D02 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V161342 in ANES. Female respondents were coded as 1 while male/others were coded as 0.

*US: Attached to GOP*
*Ireland: Attached to Sinn Féin*
This variable measures whether a respondent is close to the Sinn Féin party in Ireland or to the Republican Party (GOP) in the United States.
The following questions were posed to respondents:

- *"Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? (1) Yes; (2) No; (8) Don't Know"*
- *"Which party do you feel closest to?"*

Respondents who answered 'yes' and said they identified with the GOP or Sinn Féin are coded 1. All others, including those who said they did not identify with a party or those who identified with another party are coded 0. Refused and missing cases are excluded from the analysis. This is ascertained from variable Q22 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162292a in ANES.

*Ideology*
This variable measures a respondent's self-placement on the left-right ideological scale. This is ascertained from variable Q18 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162289 in ANES. The data is based on the following question posed to respondents:
*"Where would you place yourself on this scale? 0=Left; 10=Right."*
This is a categorical variable, originally running from 0 to 10. Respondents who answered 'Never Heard of', 'Don't Know', 'Refused', and missing cases are excluded from the analysis.

*Retrospective Economy*
This variable measures a respondent's perception of the national economy at the time of their country's election. This was ascertained from variable Q11a in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162280 in ANES.
The data is based on the following question posed to respondents:
*"Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in [COUNTRY] has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?"*
This is a categorical variable, originally running from 1 to 3. Respondents who answered 'gotten better' are coded 3 while respondents who said 'gotten worse' are coded 1. Respondents who said 'stayed the same' are coded 2. Respondents who answered 'Don't Know', 'Refused', and missing cases are excluded from the analysis.

## APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATS AND FACTOR ANALYSIS

**Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in the Multivariate Models in Ireland**

|  | *N* | *M* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vote for Sinn Féin /Anti-Austerity Alliance | 871 | 0.148 | 0.355 | 0 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent variables |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strong leader in power who bends the rules | 998 | 2.942 | 1.529 | 1 | 5 |
| Anti-politician sentiment | 998 | 2.929 | 1.268 | 1 | 5 |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | 994 | 2.313 | 0.953 | 1 | 5 |
| Nativist sentiment | 995 | 2.780 | 0.796 | 1 | 4 |
| Age | 989 | 46.141 | 16.015 | 18 | 87 |
| University education | 990 | 0.334 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| Female | 1,000 | 0.489 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Attached to Sinn Féin | 1,000 | 0.094 | 0.292 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 914 | 5.498 | 2.112 | 0 | 10 |
| Retrospective economy | 999 | 3.701 | 0.862 | 1 | 5 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016).
*Note:* Post-election interviews only.

**Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in the Multivariate Models in the United States**

|  | *N* | *M* | *SD* | *Min* | *Max* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vote for Donald Trump | 2,663 | 0.442 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent variables |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strong leader in power who bends the rules | 3,627 | 2.865 | 1.241 | 1 | 5 |
| Anti-politician sentiment | 3,624 | 3.344 | 0.906 | 1 | 5 |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | 3,609 | 2.550 | 0.914 | 1 | 5 |
| Nativist sentiment | 3,617 | 2.780 | 0.825 | 1 | 4 |
| Age | 3,553 | 49.424 | 17.511 | 18 | 90 |
| University education | 3,618 | 0.399 | 0.490 | 0 | 1 |
| Female | 3,616 | 0.531 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Attached to GOP | 3,647 | 0.250 | 0.433 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 3,503 | 5.722 | 2.463 | 0 | 10 |
| Retrospective economy | 3,623 | 3.087 | 1.037 | 1 | 5 |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017).
*Note:* Post-election interviews only.

**Table B.3: Principal Component Loadings for the Rotated Components of Measures of Populism for Ireland**

|  | *Factor* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | *1* | *2* | *3* |
| Eigenvalue | 2.739 | 1.572 | 1.083 |
| % of variance | 34.2 | 19.7 | 13.5 |
| Politicians are the main problem | 0.649 | | |
| Politicians don't care about the people | 0.688 | | |
| Politicians care only about the rich and powerful | 0.696 | | |
| Important to have Irish ancestry | | 0.583 | |
| Important to be born in Ireland | | 0.530 | |
| Important to be able to speak Irish language | | 0.469 | |
| Immigrants are good for Ireland's economy | | | 0.668 |
| Immigrants are good for Ireland's culture | | | 0.531 |
| Cronbach's alpha based on standardised item | 0.794 | 0.643 | 0.629 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* voters only (n=898).

**Table B.4: Principal Component Loadings for the Rotated Components of Measures of Populism for the United States**

|  | *Factor* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | *1* | *2* | *3* |
| Eigenvalue | 2.949 | 1.742 | |
| % of variance | 36.8 | 21.7 | |
| Important to have American ancestry | 0.763 | | |
| Important to be able to speak English language | 0.622 | | |
| Important to be born in US | 0.763 | | |
| Politicians are the main problem | | 0.616 | |
| Politicians don't care about the people | | 0.735 | |
| Politicians care only about the rich and powerful | | 0.755 | |
| Immigrants are good for America's economy | 0.649 | | |
| Immigrants are good for America's culture | 0.731 | | |
| Cronbach's alpha based on standardised item | 0.718 | 0.713 | |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* voters only (n=2,713).

## APPENDIX C: RELATED EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

**Figure C.1:  Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Elites and Vote for SF/AAA in the 2016 Irish General Election.**



*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016).
*Note:* All other variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 1/D.1 Model III. Estimated using Stata margins command.

**Figure C.2: Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Immigration and Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election.**



*Source:* (ANES, 2017).

*Note:* United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. All other variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 2/D.4 Model IV. Estimated using Stata margins command.

**Figure C.3: Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Nativism and Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election**



*Source:* (ANES, 2017).

*Note:* United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. All other variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 2/D.4 Model V. Estimated using Stata margins command.

**Table C.1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election**

| | *Dependent variable:* Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance | | | | |
| | *I-IE* | *II-IE* | *III-IE* | *IV-IE* | *V-IE* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | −0.026* | −0.027* | −0.031** | −0.026* | −0.025* |
| | (0.105) | (0.105) | (0.017) | (0.105) | (0.105) |
| University Education | −0.908* | −0.927* | −0.678 | −0.946* | −0.965* |
| | (0.370) | (0.372) | (0.374) | (0.375) | (0.375) |
| Female | −0.403 | −0.398 | −0.425 | −0.398 | −0.389 |
| | (0.314) | (0.315) | (0.319) | (0.314) | (0.315) |
| Attached to Sinn Féin | 5.088*** | 5.091*** | 4.937*** | 5.110*** | 5.178*** |
| | (0.520) | (0.521) | (0.516) | (0.523) | (0.531) |
| Ideology | −0.252*** | −0.245** | −0.232** | −0.246** | −0.242** |
| | (0.071) | (0.072) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.071) |
| Retrospective economy | −0.490** | −0.484** | −0.263 | −0.505** | −0.506** |
| | (0.170) | (0.170) | (0.181) | (0.171) | (0.171) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | −0.049 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.101) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | | 0.459** | – | – |
| | | | (0.144) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | | – | −0.103 | – |
| | | | | (0.159) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | | – | – | −0.269 |
| | | | | | (0.192) |
| Constant | 2.003* | 2.101* | −0.165 | 2.253** | 2.603** |
| | (0.798) | (0.824) | (1.042) | (0.887) | (0.912) |
| N | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | −169.40 | −169.28 | −164.17 | −169.19 | −168.40 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.479 | 0.480 | 0.495 | 0.480 | 0.482 |

*Source of data:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

**Table C.2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *I-US* | *II-US* | *III-US* | *IV-US* | *V-US* |
| Age | 0.013** | 0.013** | 0.013** | 0.014** | 0.011* |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| University Education | –0.250 | –0.200 | –0.247 | 0.019 | –0.104 |
| | (0.147) | (0.148) | (0.150) | (0.150) | (0.150) |
| Female | –0.155 | –0.145 | –0.156 | –0.181 | –0.220 |
| | (0.137) | (0.136) | (0.136) | (0.141) | (0.137) |
| Attached to GOP | 3.058*** | 3.051*** | 3.060*** | 3.109*** | 3.106*** |
| | (0.181) | (0.182) | (0.181) | (0.194) | (0.190) |
| Ideology | 0.258*** | 0.250*** | 0.258*** | 0.212*** | 0.220*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.038) | (0.037) |
| Retrospective economy | –0.835*** | –0.841*** | –0.834*** | –0.743*** | –0.802*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.070) | (0.065) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.126* | – | – | – |
| | | (0.057) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | – | 0.010 | – | – |
| | | | (0.085) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | – | – | 0.757*** | – |
| | | | | (0.087) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | – | – | – | 0.489*** |
| | | | | | (0.086) |
| Constant | –0.425 | –0.763** | –0.460 | –2.519*** | –1.620** |
| | (0.401) | (0.437) | (0.478) | (0.477) | (0.388) |
| N | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 |
| N Strata/PSU | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 |
| F and (Prob > F) | (6, 128) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) |
| | 132.34*** | 115.19*** | 115.34*** | 104.34*** | 111.74*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.
*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

## APPENDIX D: RELATED EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

**Table D.1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for
Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election
Excluding Partisanship**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *I-IE* | *II-IE* | *III-IE* | *IV-IE* | *V-IE* |
| Age | −0.015* | −0.015* | −0.020** | −0.015* | −0.015* |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| University Education | −1.271*** | −1.274*** | −1.035*** | −1.269*** | −1.271*** |
| | (0.289) | (0.290) | (0.297) | (0.292) | (0.291) |
| Female | −0.716** | −0.716** | −0.740** | −0.716** | −0.716** |
| | (0.236) | (0.236) | (0.241) | (0.236) | (0.236) |
| Ideology | −0.281*** | −0.280*** | −0.256*** | −0.282*** | −0.281*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.054) |
| Retrospective economy | −0.641*** | −0.640*** | −0.365* | −0.640*** | −0.641*** |
| | (0.131) | (0.131) | (0.141) | (0.132) | (0.131) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | −0.010 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.073) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | | 0.531*** | – | – |
| | | | (0.106) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | | – | 0.006 | – |
| | | | | (0.117) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | | – | – | −0.001 |
| | | | | | (0.142) |
| Constant | 3.267*** | 3.288*** | 0.659 | 3.252*** | 3.269*** |
| | (0.627) | (0.647) | (0.801) | (0.688) | (0.716) |
| N | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | −273.47 | −273.46 | −259.87 | −273.47 | −273.47 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.201 | 0.159 | 0.159 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.

**Table D.2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Fine Gael in the 2016 Irish General Election**

| | *Dependent variable:* Vote for Fine Gael | | | | |
| | I-IE | II-IE | III-IE | IV-IE | V-IE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| University Education | 0.369 | 0.406 | 0.321 | 0.356 | 0.345 |
| | (0.219) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.221) |
| Female | 0.177 | 0.188 | 0.178 | 0.172 | 0.182 |
| | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.212) |
| Ideology | 0.180** | 0.169** | 0.178** | 0.184** | 0.184** |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.057) |
| Attached to Fine Gael | 2.737*** | 2.748*** | 2.713*** | 2.741*** | 2.727*** |
| | (0.228) | (0.229) | (0.229) | (0.228) | (0.228) |
| Retrospective economy | 0.772*** | 0.765*** | 0.707*** | 0.764*** | 0.770*** |
| | (0.160) | (0.160) | (0.160) | (0.161) | (0.161) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.093 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.069) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | | –0.128 | – | – |
| | | | (0.096) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | | – | –0.044 | – |
| | | | | (0.122) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | | – | – | –0.100 |
| | | | | | (0.138) |
| Constant | –6.088*** | –6.306*** | –5.505*** | –5.981*** | –5.838*** |
| | (0.780) | (0.800) | (0.889) | (0.834) | (0.850) |
| N | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | –305.68 | –304.77 | –304.77 | –305.61 | –305.41 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.335 | 0.337 | 0.337 | 0.335 | 0.336 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.

**Table D.3: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Fianna Fáil in the 2016 Irish General Election**

| | I-IE | II-IE | III-IE | IV-IE | V-IE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Fianna Fáil | | | | | |
| Age | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| University Education | 0.041 | 0.052 | 0.032 | 0.095 | 0.070 |
| | (0.249) | (0.251) | (0.253) | (0.253) | (0.252) |
| Female | -0.114 | -0.115 | -0.115 | -0.117 | -0.130 |
| | (0.239) | (0.239) | (0.239) | (0.239) | (0.239) |
| Ideology | 0.099 | 0.097 | 0.099 | 0.090 | 0.094 |
| | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.059) |
| Attached to Fianna Fáil | 3.395*** | 3.383*** | 3.391*** | 3.381*** | 3.371*** |
| | (0.240) | (0.243) | (0.241) | (0.240) | (0.241) |
| Retrospective economy | -0.188 | -0.193 | -0.201 | -0.169 | -0.173 |
| | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.141) | (0.141) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.024 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.077) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | | –0.022 | – | – |
| | | | (0.105) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | | – | 0.148 | – |
| | | | | (0.124) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | | – | – | 0.137 |
| | | | | | (0.151) |
| Constant | –2.716*** | –2.770*** | –2.610*** | –3.093*** | –3.067*** |
| | (0.703) | (0.723) | (0.867) | (0.773) | (0.808) |
| N | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | –261.65 | –261.60 | –261.63 | –260.95 | –261.24 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.356 | 0.356 | 0.356 | 0.358 | 0.357 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.

**Table D.4: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election Excluding Partisanship**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *I-US* | *II-US* | *III-US* | *IV-US* | *V-US* |
| Age | 0.015*** | 0.016*** | 0.015*** | 0.016*** | 0.015** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| University Education | 0.032 | 0.078 | –0.002 | 0.274* | 0.137 |
| | (0.119) | (0.118) | (0.120) | (0.126) | (0.121) |
| Female | –0.267* | –0.258* | –0.260* | –0.308* | –0.304* |
| | (0.120) | (0.121) | (0.121) | (0.142) | (0.119) |
| Ideology | 0.414*** | 0.407*** | 0.414*** | 0.375*** | 0.385*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Retrospective economy | –0.908*** | –0.913*** | –0.915*** | –0.825*** | –0.887*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.067) | (0.069) | (0.066) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.124* | – | – | – |
| | | (0.049) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | – | –0.104 | – | – |
| | | | (0.072) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | – | – | 0.699*** | – |
| | | | | (0.072) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | – | – | – | 0.392*** |
| | | | | | (0.082) |
| Constant | –0.638 | –0.985* | –0.257 | –2.555*** | –1.612** |
| | (0.409) | (0.445) | (0.448) | (0.456) | (0.404) |
| N | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 |
| N Strata/PSU | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 |
| F and (Prob > F) | (5, 129) | (6, 128) | (6, 128) | (6, 128) | (6, 128) |
| | 84.76*** | 74.03*** | 69.86*** | 87.98*** | 76.46*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

**Table D.5: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for
The Republican Party in the 2016 General Election (House)**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Republican Party in the 2016 House election | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I-US | II-US | III-US | IV-US | V-US |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| University Education | 0.078 | 0.079 | 0.067 | 0.194 | 0.117 |
| | (0.112) | (0.115) | (0.115) | (0.111) | (0.113) |
| Female | –0.302** | –0.302** | –0.300** | –0.315** | –0.312** |
| | (0.111) | (0.111) | (0.111) | (0.112) | (0.111) |
| Ideology | 0.184*** | 0.184*** | 0.184*** | 0.159*** | 0.172*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.030) |
| Attached to the GOP | 1.590*** | 1.590*** | 1.583*** | 1.572*** | 1.596*** |
| | (0.154) | (0.154) | (0.155) | (0.155) | (0.153) |
| Retrospective economy | –0.368*** | –0.369*** | –0.371*** | –0.314*** | –0.357*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.066) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | – | 0.002 | – | – | – |
| | | (0.049) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | – | – | –0.035 | – | – |
| | | | (0.066) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | – | – | – | 0.337*** | – |
| | | | | (0.072) | |
| Nativist sentiment | – | – | – | – | 0.135 |
| | | | | | (0.074) |
| Constant | –0.807* | –0.813** | –0.678 | –1.719 | –1.130 |
| | (0.322) | (0.343) | (0.393) | (0.392) | (0.367) |
| N | 2,502 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 |
| N Strata/PSU | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 |
| F and (Prob > F) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7, 127 | (7, 127) |
| | 56.80*** | 48.53*** | 48.76*** | 50.17*** | 49.26*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.
*Note:* * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

**Table D.6: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 American Presidential Election**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I-US | II-US | III-US | IV-US | V-US |
| **Age** | | | | |
| −0.008 | −0.008 | −0.008 | −0.008 | −0.007 |
| (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| **University Education** | | | | |
| 0.021 | 0.010 | 0.029 | −0.144 | −0.093 |
| (0.126) | (0.131) | (0.127) | (0.135) | (0.137) |
| **Female** | | | | |
| 0.268* | 0.266* | 0.265* | 0.309* | 0.309* |
| (0.131) | (0.132) | (0.131) | (0.136) | (0.132) |
| **Ideology** | | | | |
| −0.278*** | −0.276*** | −0.277*** | −0.250*** | −0.248*** |
| (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.038) |
| **Attached to DEM** | | | | |
| 3.227*** | 3.224*** | 3.226*** | 3.142*** | 3.248*** |
| (0.227) | (0.227) | (0.225) | (0.224) | (0.227) |
| **Retrospective economy** | | | | |
| 0.770*** | 0.771*** | 0.771*** | 0.713*** | 0.746*** |
| (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.080) | (0.080) | (0.080) |
| **Strong leader who bends rules** | | | | |
| – | −0.028 | – | – | – |
| | (0.057) | | | |
| **Anti-politician sentiment** | | | | |
| – | – | 0.030 | – | – |
| | | (0.079) | | |
| **Anti-immigration sentiment** | | | | |
| – | – | – | −0.426*** | – |
| | | | (0.088) | |
| **Nativist sentiment** | | | | |
| – | – | – | – | −0.359*** |
| | | | | (0.089) |
| **Constant** | | | | |
| −1.280** | −1.206* | −1.394* | −0.157 | −0.421 |
| (0.426) | (0.474) | (0.549) | (0.479) | (0.497) |
| **N** | | | | |
| 2,502 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 | 2,452 |
| **N Strata/PSU** | | | | |
| 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 | 132/265 |
| **F and (Prob > F)** | | | | |
| (6, 128) | (7, 127) | (7, 127) | (7,127) | (7, 127) |
| 50.05*** | 42.49*** | 44.61*** | 44.96*** | 47.53*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.

*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

**Table D.7: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election Face-to-Face Sample Only**

| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *I-US* | *II-US* | *III-US* | *IV-US* | *V-US* |
| Age | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.016 |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| University Education | −0.177 | −0.149 | −0.084 | 0.135 | 0.025 |
| | (0.264) | (0.251) | (0.258) | (0.278) | (0.278) |
| Female | −0.223 | −0.232 | −0.234 | −0.300 | −0.294 |
| | (0.294) | (0.302) | (0.296) | (0.300) | (0.290) |
| Ideology | 0.342*** | 0.335*** | 0.344*** | 0.277*** | 0.302*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.068) |
| Attached to the GOP | 2.755*** | 2.755*** | 2.806*** | 2.818*** | 2.840*** |
| | (0.268) | (0.267) | (0.264) | (0.298) | (0.301) |
| Retrospective economy | −1.030*** | −1.029*** | −1.017*** | −0.961*** | −0.996*** |
| | (0.181) | (0.181) | (0.183) | (0.170) | (0.183) |
| Strong leader who bends rules | − | 0.059 | − | − | − |
| | | (0.094) | | | |
| Anti-politician sentiment | − | − | 0.183 | − | − |
| | | | (0.134) | | |
| Anti-immigration sentiment | − | − | − | 0.793*** | − |
| | | | | (0.190) | |
| Nativist sentiment | − | − | − | − | 0.465* |
| | | | | | (0.176) |
| Constant | −0.542 | −0.699 | −1.221 | −2.427* | −1.749* |
| | (0.855) | (0.824) | (0.797) | (0.822) | (0.752) |
| N | 677 | 677 | 677 | 677 | 677 |
| N Strata/PSU | 32/65 | 32/65 | 32/65 | 32/65 | 32/65 |
| F and (Prob > F) | (6, 28) | (7, 27) | (7, 27) | (7, 27) | (7, 27) |
| | 55.76*** | 49.11*** | 45.64*** | 50.00*** | 41.95*** |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.

*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

**Table D.8: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election Using Purist[11] Measure of Populism**

*Dependent variable:* Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election

|                                        | I-US       | II-US      |
|----------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Age                                    | 0.013**    | 0.013**    |
|                                        | (0.004)    | (0.004)    |
| University Education                   | −0.250     | −0.236     |
|                                        | (0.146)    | (0.147)    |
| Female                                 | −0.156     | −0.158     |
|                                        | (0.137)    | (0.137)    |
| Ideology                               | 0.258***   | 0.256***   |
|                                        | (0.035)    | (0.035)    |
| Attached to the GOP                    | 3.058***   | 3.062***   |
|                                        | (0.182)    | (0.181)    |
| Retrospective economy                  | −0.835***  | −0.831***  |
|                                        | (0.065)    | (0.066)    |
| People should make important decisions | –          | 0.063      |
|                                        |            | (0.063)    |
| Constant                               | −0.425     | −0.648     |
|                                        | (0.400)    | (0.454)    |
| N                                      | 2,452      | 2,451      |
| N Strata/PSU                           | 132/65     | 132/65     |
| F and (Prob > F)                       | (6, 128)   | (7, 127)   |
|                                        | 132.34***  | 112.82***  |

*Source:* (ANES, 2017). *Base:* Voters only.

*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA *svyset* following recommendation of ANES Codebook.

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[11] We classify the purist measures of populism as those that specifically refer to "the people" or closely mimic some of the questions asked by Akkermann *et al.* (2014). We do not include the question about compromise as it was not asked in Ireland, thereby limiting the comparison.

**Table D.9: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in 2016 Irish General Election Using Purist Measure of Populism**

| | I-IE | II-IE |
|---|---|---|
| *Dependent variable:* Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance | | |
| Age | –0.026* | –0.026* |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| University Education | –0.909* | –0.889* |
| | (0.369) | (0.373) |
| Female | –0.403 | –0.415 |
| | (0.314) | (0.316) |
| Ideology | –0.252*** | –0.249*** |
| | (0.071) | (0.071) |
| Attached to Sinn Féin | 5.088*** | 5.064*** |
| | (0.521) | (0.522) |
| Retrospective economy | –0.489** | –0.471** |
| | (0.170) | (0.174) |
| People should make important decisions | – | 0.055 |
| | | (0.113) |
| Constant | 2.003 | 1.724 |
| | (0.798) | (0.985) |
| N | 785 | 785 |
| Log likelihood | –169.39861 | –169.28079 |
| Pseudo-$R^2$ | 0.480 | 0.480 |

*Source:* (Marsh *et al.*, 2016). *Base:* Voters only.

*Note:* * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$.

**Table D.10: An Exploration of Differences Between Ireland and the United States**

|  | *Ireland* | *United States* |
|---|---|---|
| *Individual level* | | |
| Partisanship | Low | High |
| Mean voter perception | | |
| of economy (1-5) | 3.70 | 3.09 |
| Mean voter ideology (0-10) | *5.50* | *5.72* |
| | | |
| *Macro level: political system* | | |
| Electoral System | PR | Majoritarian |
| Governance System | Parliamentary | Presidential |
| Party System | Multi-party | 2-Party |
| 'Classic populist party' in situ | *No* | *No* |
| | | |
| *Macro level: cultural* | | |
| Proportion of white people | 94.3% | 73.6% |
| Emigration | High | Low |
| Immigration | *High* | *High* |
| Language | Dominant language but small segments speak other languages | Dominant language but large segments speak other languages |
| | | |
| *Macro level: economic/regional* | | |
| Geography | Europe | North America |
| Size (area and population) | Small | Large |
| Military Stance | Neutral | Major World Player |
| Cost of living index (numbeo) | *84.88* | *77.23* |
| Welfare system (Epsing-Anderson) | Liberal | Liberal |
| Gross National Income | Mid-table | Among highest in world |
| GDP | Mid-table | Among highest in world |

*Please note: Italics* indicate similarities.