Self-Silencing: Hermeneutical Injustice & Kristen Roupenian's 'Cat Person'

Clare Maunder

Abstract

Miranda Fricker's 2007 theory of epistemic injustice describes an exclusion or silencing of particular identities that prevents them from full participation in the world as 'knowers'. These identities are denied full human status. Hermeneutical injustice, one of its strains, pinpoints a difficulty in comprehending one's own experiences when robbed of an adequate conceptual basis. An insidious form of silencing, it goes easily unnoticed. Kristen Roupenian's 2017 short story 'Cat Person' deals with widely acknowledged millennial concerns, including an encounter of "bad" sex, where Margot, I argue, is hermeneutically silenced. Its 2017 publication situates the narrative within the resurgence of the Me Too movement, while its widespread public reaction frames the story as a point of interest in 'real life' instances of hermeneutical injustice. Both 'Cat Person' the text, and its reactions, therefore outline the negative conceptual space which suffocates the potentiality for an identity to be an identity due to the unavailability of adequate terminology to navigate lived experiences.

To be silenced implies an asymmetrical power dynamic between the silencer and the silenced. Being silenced, however, most commonly calls to mind an externalised occurrence, in which a capacity to communicate might be wrested from the hopeful speaker. Yet the ability to vocalise relies upon the prior ability to verbalise. To verbalise an experience or a thought, an available set of concepts by which one can make sense of their own experience is a precondition. An absence of such adequate conceptual material therefore silences an individual even before their thoughts can be vocalised. This notion has been deemed 'hermeneutical injustice,' a strain of the broader umbrella term epistemic injustice, where there is an ineptitude of available concepts through which one can come to understand their own lived experiences. This area of the absence of concepts has been furnished through recent developments in the field of analytical feminst philosophy, seen most prominently in

the notion of epistemic injustice, as first posed by Miranda Fricker in her 2007 *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Related to injustices involving knowledge, epistemic injustice is used to navigate which identities are able to possess full credibility, which identities are more fully believed, which are silenced, even before the words to be silenced have been formulated, whose words are excluded or silenced, miscast or misrepresented. In such instances where someone is wronged 'in their capacity as a subject of knowledge', they are therefore wronged 'in a capacity essential to human value'.[1] Epistemic injustice deals with silencing, both as an external act, and more insidious acts of silencing through the unavailability of necessary concepts to navigate lived experiences. The unequal weighting of which identities are silenced, whether vocally or verbally, is explored in Kristen Roupenian's 'Cat Person', a 2017 viral short story which depicts an encounter that can be broadly described as 'bad' sex - 'encounters that don't rise to the level of harassment or assault, but still merit a closer examination'.[2] Published in the wake of the resurgence of the Me Too movement, both 'Cat Person' as a piece of literature, and the reactions it engendered, gain clarity through the lens of epistemic injustice.

The two central characters of 'Cat Person', Margot and Robert, encounter the experiences delineated for them by their respectively available conceptual material. The story follows the unfolding of a 'brief, awkward' relationship between college student Margot and thirty-something year old Robert, following their meeting at a film theatre concession stand where Margot worked.[3] They go on a date, and, after a drink, return to Robert's, where the tricky sexual encounter occurs. Its aftermath sees Margot's discomfort receiving Robert's ensuing text messages. Her bodily articulation contradicts her verbal inability to articulate, or even decipher, what or why she feels the way she does. Its depictions of a tricky sexual encounter, ambiguities in assessing tone over text message exchange, and navigating dating 'undoubtedly reflects the cultural moment...touching important

1 Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5.

2 Anna Silman, 2017a, "9 Men on Seeing Themselves in 'Cat Person,'" *The Cut*, 12 December, 2017.

3 Kelly Walsh and Terry Murphy, "Irresolute Endings and Rhetorical Poetics: Readers Respond to Roupenian's "Cat Person,"" *Style* 53, no. 1 (2019): 89.

concerns for anxious millennials and the Me Too movement'.[4] It was, notably, one of the two most read pieces of 2017, alongside Ronan Farrow's essay exposing accusations of sexual assault and harassment against Harvey Weinstein.[5] The fact that it was Roupenian's verbalisation of the build-up, event, and aftermath of the encounter of 'bad' sex that struck a chord with readers should be read as indicative of the lack of adequate conceptual resources that ultimately exploit gendered sexual (and more general power) relations. In other words, it was an instance of epistemic injustice that resonated with readers.

Epistemic injustices both occur as a result of, and reinforce, structural injustices, as Kristie Dotson points out: 'our resources for making sense of our worlds can become discriminatory due to an asymmetrical ability of some groups to affect the ways in which a given society makes sense of the world'.[6] Language, one of the 'resources for making sense of our worlds', is reflected in dominant power structures. 'Some groups' are more lacking in conceptual resources than others in the use of language to make sense of the world, which marks it out as an injustice. As a result of an injustice, therefore, epistemic injustice further exacerbates the unequal weighting in these fields. There are two strains of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. While testimonial injustice involves an unjust reaction to words spoken - it occurs 'when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word'—hermeneutical injustice is to do with a lack of concepts with which one can interpret their experiences: 'hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretive resources put someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences'.[7] Kirstie Dotson clarifies that in hermeneutical injustice 'credibility is no longer the site of epistemic injustice'.[8] Instead, the injustices are situated in 'socioepistemic structures that create and sustain hermeneutical inequality'.[9] Structurally located, not necessarily enacted consciously by the individual, but instead

4 Walsh and Murphy, "Irresolute Endings and Rhetorical Poetics", *Style* 53, no. 1 (2019): 89.

5 Ibid

6 Kristie Dotson, "A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression," *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 33*, no. 1 (2012): 29.

7 Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1.

8 Dotson, "A Cautionary Tale" *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 33*, no. 1 (2012): 30.

9 Ibid, 29.

mediated unwittingly by the individual, hermeneutical injustices are hidden from plain sight, which explains the difficulties in not only rectifying them, but noticing them in the first place. Instances of testimonial injustice can clip an identity as it comes to be realised. Instances of hermeneutical injustice, meanwhile, have the more sinister capacity to leave an individual grappling at a negative space for an identity they cannot even conceptualise.

This calls to Kristie Dotson's formulation of 'testimonial smothering' , in which there is a 'kind of self-silencing'), to recycle Manne's phrase, on the part of the speaker[10],[11]. This 'self-silencing' is what the following tweet, posted in response to the online publication of Roupenian's 'Cat Person', assumes has occurred:'[s]omething I found quite disturbing about the story is just how much a woman expects a man to clairvoyantly 'know' about what she's thinking and what she needs? [...] I can't help but wonder how differently it would have played out, had she been more honest and open with him?'[12].

This tweet verbalises the common question that arises in discourse surrounding tricky sex: 'Why didn't she say anything?' But what if we pose the other side of the epistemic question. What if Margot could not know what she was thinking; if Margot's silence was less an instance of 'self-silencing,' less a deficiency in her being 'honest,' or willingness to be 'open,' and more characteristic of a prior suffocation? After all, thoughts that cannot be verbalised cannot be vocalised.

With this in mind, the attention 'Cat Person' has received specifically as a piece of fiction, is of note. What underlies debates surrounding its status as a contested piece of fiction or nonfiction have to do with how far it is taken as a credible source raising important questions. Yet, as an article in *The Economist* points out, its very status as a fictional piece is what carved space for these discussions: 'and because the story is a work of fiction, rather than a tub-thumping op-ed, it probes these issues with an appreciation of their complexity'[13]. This 'appreciation' allows them to be deconstructed and unpacked; veracity does not necessarily have to wade into the issue. But this in itself runs the risk of the story not being taken seriously beyond its bounds as a piece of literature. A double bind emerges. For how can you communicate experiences that might fall victim to testimonial injustice if not in a fictitious piece, and yet how can the issues raised in this piece be taken seriously beyond their bounds as a piece of fiction? That attention was divided on precisely this issue references the instances of epistemic justice at play. The question must be posed as to what other form of writing a piece depicting that which struggles to be communicated, that might easily be silenced could take. To fail to take the reactions and solidarity it elicited seriously would be to silence those voices raised. In other words, it would be an instance of testimonial injustice - disregarding real, lived experiences brought together through a piece due to their inspiration from a piece of fiction. Roxanne Gay summarises this boundary clearly in a tweet: 'it is a fiction that speaks to very real things women deal with'[14]. The very fact that there was such an uproar and debate over its identity as fiction, surely, if all else is too tenuous, proves that this story, especially coming to light in the age of Me Too, can be used as a divining tool for locating a tender place in society, where there are more questions than answers.

Other definitional debates surround the sexual encounter in the story. While some responses to the short story accept the sexual experience straddles the boundary between consensual and nonconsensual sex, others aim to confine the story to an either/or model. In an interview with *The New Yorker*, Roupenian is asked outright whether the sex is consensual or non-consensual. Roupenian's response goes to show that the attention spent assigning either descriptor of consensual or non-consensual to the sexual act sidesteps the bigger issue of conceptual deficiency: she mediates 'But I'm more interested in the way that Margot herself weighs the cost of her own decision to consent'[15]. 'Margot, choosing between having sex she doesn't want and 'seeming spoiled and capricious', decides to have unwanted sex'[16]. Deciding to have 'un-

10 Kate Manne, *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny* (UK: Penguin Random House, 2019), 3,4.

11 Ibid, 4.

12 E.B, "What is it about 'Cat Person'?," *The Economist*, 14 December, 2017.

13 Ibid

14 Walsh and Murphy, "Irresolute Endings and Rhetorical Poetics", *Style* 53, no. 1 (2019): 91.

15 Deborah Treisman, "Kristen Roupenian on the Self-Deceptions of Dating," *The New Yorker*, 4 December, 2017

16 Ibid

wanted sex' is a paradox in terms, and implies the ineffectuality of the given terms. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, when applied to Margot's decision to have 'unwanted sex', offer insight on the mechanisms through which Margot's decision comes to bear.

Margot and Robert's relationship is not seen, nor should it be analysed, in a vacuum. The facts of their date gesture obliquely to the broader dynamics at work that colour their interactions with the other. Robert learns during the date that Margot is twenty; he reveals his age as thirty-four only after they have sex: 'It was something I wanted to bring up with you, but I didn't know how you'd take it'[17]. As Margot is underage, Robert buys them both drinks. These revelations, although not enough in themselves to condone or condemn Robert's actions as strictly either moral or immoral, provide contextual additions that further muddy the already murky water and hint at the wider field of structural imbalances that Dotson notes in her clarification on the positioning of injustices in matters of hermeneutical injustice. As sole focaliser for the story, reader's gain access only to Margot's direct thoughts; readers can make assessments on Robert's character through his actions and Margot's mediations as she tries to construct and make sense of his identity herself. The device of focalisation streamlines the narrative and amplifies for the reader Margot's increasing separation from self as she tries to navigate the unfamiliar surroundings of Robert's house and the situation of 'unwanted sex'. Margot is processing the newness of the situation, 'it occurred to her' that 'she'd never gone to someone's house to have sex before', when Robert interrupts her thoughts: 'then he was kissing her, throwing her bag and their coats on the couch and ushering her into the bedroom'[18].

As they move into the bedroom, Margot becomes more hesitant about the prospect of sex. Dotson's 'testimonial smothering' is a clarifying concept to interpret the text at the moment Margot's clear desire to have sex falters[19]: '[l]ooking at him like that, so awkwardly bent, his belly thick and soft and covered with hair, Margot recoiled.

17 Kristen Roupenian, "Cat Person," *The New Yorker*, December 4, 2017.

18 Ibid

19 Kate Manne, *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny* (UK: Penguin Ran-

But the thought of what it would take to stop what she had set in motion was overwhelming; it would require an amount of tact and gentleness that she felt would be impossible to summon'[20].

There is no isolated sentence, or word, that alone crystallises her desire to not have sex. Instead, the 'impossibility' of the act overshadows her creeping realisation she might not want 'to go through with it'[21]. The thought eclipsed before it is explicitly stated, Margot is silenced by the situation; to vocalise what is on the cusp of being verbalised is 'overwhelming' and feels 'impossible'. Her subsequent decision to have 'unwanted sex' collapses the boundaries of consensual and nonconsensual sex. Couched in terms of 'overwhelming' and 'impossible,' the weight of Margot's decision dissolves. It seems less a complete decision on her part, and more the result of a lack of alternate possibilities. With a lack of alternate possibilities, she is prevented from 'being who she is,' to return to Fricker's quotation, and must assume the role sketched out for her by conceptual ineffectuality.

As the flimsy conceptual basis available to her to comprehend her experiences buckle, Margot increasingly withdraws from the text. When Robert 'made that sound again, that high-pitched feminine whine,' Margot 'wished there were a way she could ask him not to do that, but she couldn't think of any'[22]. The undeniable presence of her 'wish' here, that 'she could ask him not to do that' is overwhelmed by the echo of its impossible utterance. Or, to put more aptly, the weight of her 'wish' crushes the feeble conceptual scaffolding available. The text here traces the outline of a conceptual absence which silences Margot and robs her of agency to act out another sexual script. She is sealed within the impossibilities of breaking outside of the hermeneutical injustice. As Roupenian states in an interview: 'the option of a blunt refusal doesn't even consciously occur to' her[23].

As the act continues, Margot's focalisation, the 'dominant code'of the narrative, moves beyond the bounds of her body to project herself from Robert's point of view instead[24]. Podhorny, in her work on literary presentations of

20 Roupenian, "Cat Person," *The New Yorker*, 2017.

21 Ibid

22 Roupenian, "Cat Person," *The New Yorker*, December 4, 2017.

23 Treisman, "Self-Deceptions of Dating" *The New Yorker*, 2017.

24 Walsh and Murphy, "Irresolute Endings and Rhetorical Poetics", *Style* 53, no. 1 (2019): 91.

sexual consent, references this progression: 'at one point, the action plays out like Robert is the only agent and Margot is merely being acted upon'[25]. There is a marked shift from her earlier focalisation where she hypothesises what Robert might be thinking. During this experience, she leaves herself, and drains herself of an inhabited, personal identity, and in its place constructs herself in the image of what she wishfully imagines her fantasy of her to be: 'look at this beautiful girl, she imagined him thinking', 'she's so perfect, her body is perfect, everything about her is perfect'[26]. In this moment the internal voice inside her head does not belong to her, but him. Lacking conceptual resources to navigate her experience as herself, Margot transforms herself into a 'she, a construction of herself as an Other to herself. This becomes most pronounced, and most jarring, in her immediate thoughts after the sex stops, when 'Margot' takes over from the 'she': 'she marvelled at herself a little while, at the mystery of this person who'd just done this bizarre, inexplicable thing'[27]. Bereft of a conceptual framework that grants her agency in this situation, her just past self is unknowable to her, and linguistic attempts to gain clarity on this matter can only be couched in effable terms: 'mystery,' 'bizarre,' 'inexplicable'.

One moment in particular poses the thinnest membrane between Margot's verbalisation, and wanted vocalisation, of her experiences. The narratives states: '[i]nsisting that they stop now, after everything she'd done to push this forward, would make her seem spoiled and capricious, as if she'd ordered something at a restaurant and then, once the food arrived, had changed her mind and sent it back'[28]. Margot here self-communicates a desire to 'stop what she had set in motion' via a simile, thereby borrowing from other frames of reference which, despite providing a framework to define her own feelings, can nonetheless only be an approximation of her feelings[29]. The material she uses is a borrowed one, that asserts the hermeneutical injustice of independent and available frameworks by which to navigate her feelings for which the simile comes to stand in. Taking for granted Margot's ability to self-communicate here,

25 Anne-Mette Martine Podhorney, "The Gray Area: Literary Representations of Sexual Consent" (Master's dissertation, University of Oslo, 2019), 23.

26 Roupenian, "Cat Person", *The New Yorker*, 2017.

27 Ibid

28 Ibid

29 Ibid

hermeneutical injustice has not collapsed, but has been partially mediated. Similar to the instance where Margot 'recoiled', the hypothetical she summons to parallel her experiences does not make its way independently into the text, but alongside a negation of her ability to 'insist[...] that they stop now'[30]. What lurks beneath her unease to be perceived as 'spoiled and capricious' is the uncertainty - or, inversely, a presumed certainty—of *Robert* not possessing an adequate reciprocal concept to understand Margot's experiences. Margot's experiences, whether or not they can be read as self-communicable, are solipsistic ones. The effectiveness of conceptual material is only deemed so from its ready comprehension by external sources as well as the individual. Having the correct concepts to verbalise in this instance does not release Margot from the act of being silenced - that would require Robert to possess an adequate framework with which to comprehend Margot's experiences. Margot is still silenced, if not by a complete hermeneutical injustice, then by more structural issues that orient Margot's priorities toward accepting unwanted sex rather than leaving an unpleasant impression.

Situating Margot's experience within the personal reactions of online readers, it becomes clear that the specificity of what actually resonated with readers was not an explanation of events, but rather an acknowledgement of the incommunicability of Margot's experience to anyone else, and even, most pressingly, to herself, with the words that were available to her. One tweet expresses the universality of 'Cat Person's' depiction of sex, 'every single woman I've seen sharing this talks about how relatable it is, which is really fucking sad'[31], while another describes their limited success at articulating the inarticulable, tweeting 'it describes things I have only felt in non-verbal, half-formed thoughts'[32]. These tweets, as well as Roupenian's description of Margot's experience are instances of 'looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice'[33]. They mark out the parameters of the hermeneutical injustice, even as their identities are

30 Ibid

31 Silman, 2017a, *The Cut*, 2017.

32 Ibid.

33 Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), viii.

threatened by the unavailability of helpful terminology. Regardless of whether Margot's use of simile is an example of her breaking through hermeneutical injustice, she seems unaware of this fact. In the remainder of the story hermeneutic injustice becomes an increasingly overbearing figure as Margot is followed by an absence of words that can help her make sense of her experience to herself in retrospect. Despite bodily confirmation that a "wrong" has occurred - when she receives a text from him she feels 'overwhelmed with a skin-crawling loathing that felt vastly disproportionate to anything he had actually done'—she is bewildered by herself: 'but why should she feel that way?'[34]. This poses the dilemma: if a person cannot make sense of their own experience to themselves, that experience can not be communicated to the outside world, which further marginalises and perpetuates various epistemic injustices which are played out in different ways. Fricker illustrates this through the case of Carmita Wood, whose own discriminatory experiences as a member of staff at Cornell University in the 1970s engendered the creation of a new terminology, 'sexual harassment'[35]. Unable to articulate her experiences, Wood was denied unemployment benefits, and resigned[36]. Her subsequent co-creation of the term with Lin Farley bridged this hermeneutical gap[37], which before exemplified, as expressed by Fricker, how 'extant collective hermeneutical resources can have a lacuna where the name of a distinct social experience should be'[38].

34 Roupenian, "Cat Person", *The New Yorker*, 2017.

35 Dotson, "A Cautionary Tale", *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 33*, no. 1 (2012): 29-30.

36 Ibid, 30.

37 Rebecca Mason, "Two Kinds of Unknowing," *Hypatia* 26, no.2 (2011): 297.

38 Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 97.

However, hermeneutical injustices cannot be remedied through conceptual existence alone. It's a matter of having the *right* concepts. Concepts themselves can still be weighted against the marginalised and perform acts of suffocation. Take the case of Donald Trump's former lawyer, Michael Cohen, who denied the rape testimonies issued by Ivana Trump, on the grounds that it is a legal impossibility to rape one's wife[39]. The hermeneutics available here dually suffocate legalistic attempts to dispense justice, and simultaneously mock the fact of her testimony by actually acknowledging the conceptual existence, but technical impossibility, of the very thing she alleged. To rephrase Betty Friedan's famous quotation, this is not an instance of 'the problem with no name', but, rather, a problem whose name is part of the problem, that problem functioning to epistemically disadvantage[40]. In the case of 'Cat Person', for example, it is Margot who suffers unequally the weight of the absence that constitutes hermeneutical injustice. Rape and domestic abuse myths, Katharine Jenkins argues, 'function to obscure understandings of these phenomena, including victims' understanding of their own experiences'[41]. By much the same token as Manne explains that 'the idea of rapists as monsters exonerates by caricature', these frameworks work to absolve the perpetrator at the expense of the victim who is silenced[42]. Individuals who have experienced rape or domestic abuse, equipped with distorted myths which obscure the actuality of the experience, are less likely to see these terms as applicable to their own experiences. These findings further furnish, or rather, further reveal as threadbare, the conceptual field Margot (and, by extrapolation, the people with whom her experiences resonate) has to work with.

39 Kate Manne, *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny* (UK: Penguin Random House, 2019), 5.

40 Ibid, 197.

41 Katharine Jenkins, "Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 34, no. 2 (2017): 192.

42 Manne, *The Logic of Misogyny* (UK: Penguin Random House, 2019), 199.

The Me Too movement can be framed as an exercise to scaffold a working conceptual basis to mediate this issue. It can be theorised as a 'hermeneutical dissent'[43], a term proposed by Goetze to open up Fricker's theory to account for the process by which marginalised groups produce their own interpretive tools to bridge hermeneutical gaps. Debra L. Jackson takes this approach, appreciating that the movement 'makes visible' epistemic injustices of people who have experienced sexual harassment and sexual violence[44]. She also references the capacity the movement has to help individuals work through the injuries inflicted by epistemic injustices. She states that the movement 'helps overcome that injustice through a process of mutual recognition'[45]. The act of vocalising 'me too' does not provide an explanation, but, akin to what Margot's experiences in 'Cat Person' might provide for the reader, issues an act of solidarity in acknowledgement that the experience happened. Here, individual identities come together in a collective

43 S. Trystan Goetze, "Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice," *Hypatia* 33, no. 1 (2018): 73.

44 Debra L. Jackson, '"Me Too": Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition," *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* 4, no. 4 Article 7 (2018): 1.

45 Ibid, 3.

act of recognition to mark out the gaps left by epistemic injustices with the proof of their lived experiences. An act of resistance, these identities are formed in the very gap by which they were previously silenced. Karyn Freedman, in her work on Me Too's epistemic importance, expands upon its ameliorative nature: 'although a hashtag will not heal you, seeing yourself in someone else's story can be deeply impactful'[46]. This 'Other' that Margot becomes when concepts fail her could be reconceptualised as part of her healing process. It could provide a healing mirror image to Margot seeing herself as, and in, Robert's fantasies.

In December 2017, the same month that saw the publication of Roupenian's 'Cat Person', 'the silence breakers' were named the *Time* person of the year[47]. This declaration can be viewed as a retributive effort to rectify epistemic imbalances; voices previously silenced and prohibited from assuming an identity, are here outlined and existentially justified in a collectively named group. We do not know how 'Cat Person' would have played out had Margot possessed the requisite conceptual framework, but that in itself is negligible. In cases of epistemic injustice, as Fricker points out, it is not who the individual will be, or could be, that is robbed of an identity, but 'who they are'[48]. It is not a denial of a future potential self; it is the denial of the very identity *of* the self to be a self. The full consequential unfolding of epistemic injustice's negation of selves to be selves, in equal measures regretful and fitting, is not possible until there is a conceptual sufficiency at the tip of each individual's tongue to communicate their lived experience.

46 Karyn L. Freedman, "The Epistemic Significance of #MeToo," *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* 6, no2 Article 7 (2020): 8.

47 Stephanie Zacharek et al, "The Silence Breakers," *TIME*, 18 December, 2017.

48 Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5.

Hilma Af Klint (1862-1944), *The Swan (No. 17)* 1915 | Oil on Canvas 150 × 151 cm
© Courtesy of Stiftelsen Hilma af Klints Verk.

Hildegard Von Bingen (1098-1179), Embroidered Illumination in the third vision of *Scivias*,1152

This publiction is funded partly by The DU Trinity Publications Committee.

This publication claims no special rights or privileges.

All serious complaints may be directed towards chair@trinitypublications or Chair, Trinity Publications, House 6, Trinity College, Dublin 2.
Appeals may be directed to the Press Council.

Get involved with Trinity Publications through Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, or email secretary@trinitypublications.ie